THE EGALITARIAN NON-k-AVERAGED CONTRIBUTION (ENkAC-) VALUE FOR TU-GAMES
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Cites work
- A solidarity value for n-person transferable utility games
- Collinearity between the Shapley value and the egalitarian division rules for cooperative games
- Game theory and the Tennessee Valley Authority
- The Nucleolus of a Characteristic Function Game
- The least square prenucleolus and the least square nucleolus. Two values for TU games based on the excess vector
Cited in
(7)- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1187061 (Why is no real title available?)
- Consistency, population solidarity, and egalitarian solutions for TU-games
- Associated consistency characterization of two linear values for TU games by matrix approach
- Players' dummification and the dummified egalitarian non-separable contribution value
- The equal collective gains value in cooperative games
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1187059 (Why is no real title available?)
- Group contributions in TU-games: a class of \(k\)-lateral Shapley values
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