THE EGALITARIAN NON-k-AVERAGED CONTRIBUTION (ENkAC-) VALUE FOR TU-GAMES
DOI10.1142/S0219198999000050zbMATH Open1028.91512OpenAlexW2157053552MaRDI QIDQ4485673FDOQ4485673
Authors: T. Namekata, Theo S. H. Driessen 
Publication date: 19 June 2000
Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198999000050
Recommendations
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1187059
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1187061
- Consistency, population solidarity, and egalitarian solutions for TU-games
- A solidarity value for \(n\)-person transferable utility games
- The Egalitarian Shapley value: a generalization based on coalition sizes
Shapley valuetransferable utility gamescentre of the imputation set valueEgalitarian non-\(k\)-averaged contribution valueegalitarian non-pairwise-averaged contribution valueegalitarian non-separable contribution value
Cites Work
- The Nucleolus of a Characteristic Function Game
- Game theory and the Tennessee Valley Authority
- A solidarity value for \(n\)-person transferable utility games
- The least square prenucleolus and the least square nucleolus. Two values for TU games based on the excess vector
- Collinearity between the Shapley value and the egalitarian division rules for cooperative games
Cited In (7)
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Associated consistency characterization of two linear values for TU games by matrix approach
- Consistency, population solidarity, and egalitarian solutions for TU-games
- Players' dummification and the dummified egalitarian non-separable contribution value
- The equal collective gains value in cooperative games
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Group contributions in TU-games: a class of \(k\)-lateral Shapley values
This page was built for publication: THE EGALITARIAN NON-k-AVERAGED CONTRIBUTION (ENkAC-) VALUE FOR TU-GAMES
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q4485673)
