The efficient, symmetric and linear values for cooperative games and their characterizations
From MaRDI portal
Publication:5022154
DOI10.1007/978-981-16-4737-6_7zbMATH Open1481.91015OpenAlexW4206272178MaRDI QIDQ5022154FDOQ5022154
Authors: Sujata Goala, Surajit Borkotokey 
Publication date: 18 January 2022
Published in: Indian Statistical Institute Series (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-4737-6_7
Recommendations
- On a new method of analyzing properties of efficient, symmetric and linear values of TU-games
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1841897
- Linear efficient and symmetric values for TU-games: sharing the joint gain of cooperation
- The class of efficient linear symmetric values for games in partition function form
- The Egalitarian efficient extension of the Aumann-Drèze value
Cites Work
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Coincidence of and collinearity between game theoretic solutions
- A solidarity value for \(n\)-person transferable utility games
- Null players, solidarity, and the egalitarian Shapley values
- Linear efficient and symmetric values for TU-games: sharing the joint gain of cooperation
- Implementation and axiomatization of discounted Shapley values
- The family of least square values for transferable utility games
- ``Procedural values for cooperative games
- On a family of values for TU-games generalizing the Shapley value
- Modeling values for TU-games using generalized versions of consistency, standardness and the null player property
- Extensions of Hart and Mas-Colell's consistency to efficient, linear, and symmetric values for TU-games
- The consensus value: a new solution concept for cooperative games
- On convex combinations of two values
- A Weighted Pseudo-potential Approach to Values for TU-games
- On a class of solidarity values
- Axiomatization and implementation of a class of solidarity values for TU-games
Cited In (10)
- Ordinal equivalence of values, Pigou-Dalton transfers and inequality in TU-games
- The class of efficient linear symmetric values for games in partition function form
- Linear efficient and symmetric values for TU-games: sharing the joint gain of cooperation
- Cohesive players: characterizations of a subclass of efficient, symmetric, and linear values
- Sequentially two-leveled egalitarianism for TU games: characterization and application
- On the symmetry relation between different characteristic functions for additively separable cooperative games
- On the inverse problem for a subclass of linear, symmetric and efficient values of cooperative TU games
- On a new method of analyzing properties of efficient, symmetric and linear values of TU-games
- New characterizations of the discounted Shapley values
- Linear and symmetric allocation methods for partially defined cooperative games
This page was built for publication: The efficient, symmetric and linear values for cooperative games and their characterizations
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q5022154)
