The efficient, symmetric and linear values for cooperative games and their characterizations

DOI10.1007/978-981-16-4737-6_7MaRDI QIDQ5022154zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Sujata Goala, Surajit Borkotokey

Publication date 18 January 2022

Published in Indian Statistical Institute Series (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-4737-6_7

zbMATH Keywords

characterizationsTU gamesegalitarian Shapley valueESL values

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3078997 (Why is no real title available?)
• A Weighted Pseudo-potential Approach to Values for TU-games
• A solidarity value for n-person transferable utility games
• Axiomatization and implementation of a class of solidarity values for TU-games
• Coincidence of and collinearity between game theoretic solutions
• Extensions of Hart and Mas-Colell's consistency to efficient, linear, and symmetric values for TU-games
• Implementation and axiomatization of discounted Shapley values
• Linear efficient and symmetric values for TU-games: sharing the joint gain of cooperation
• Modeling values for TU-games using generalized versions of consistency, standardness and the null player property
• Null players, solidarity, and the egalitarian Shapley values
• On a class of solidarity values
• On a family of values for TU-games generalizing the Shapley value
• On convex combinations of two values
• The consensus value: a new solution concept for cooperative games
• The family of least square values for transferable utility games
• ``Procedural values for cooperative games

Cited in

(10)

• Ordinal equivalence of values, Pigou-Dalton transfers and inequality in TU-games
• The class of efficient linear symmetric values for games in partition function form
• Linear efficient and symmetric values for TU-games: sharing the joint gain of cooperation
• Cohesive players: characterizations of a subclass of efficient, symmetric, and linear values
• Sequentially two-leveled egalitarianism for TU games: characterization and application
• On the inverse problem for a subclass of linear, symmetric and efficient values of cooperative TU games
• On the symmetry relation between different characteristic functions for additively separable cooperative games
• On a new method of analyzing properties of efficient, symmetric and linear values of TU-games
• New characterizations of the discounted Shapley values
• Linear and symmetric allocation methods for partially defined cooperative games

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