Benefit sharing in holding situations

DOI10.1016/J.EJOR.2003.06.030zbMATH Open1113.91006OpenAlexW2027546753MaRDI QIDQ707151FDOQ707151

Ana Meca, Marco Antonio López Cerdá, Stef Tijs

Publication date: 9 February 2005

Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://research.tilburguniversity.edu/en/publications/718b8e18-eb6f-407b-a9cd-e5d9583cb37c

zbMATH Keywords

storage problem

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Inventory, storage, reservoirs (90B05)

Cites Work

• The Nucleolus of a Characteristic Function Game
• Theory of games and economic behavior.
• Cores of convex games
• Validation of subgradient optimization
• The kernel of a cooperative game
• Clan games
• Some remarks on the construction of higher order algorithms in convex optimization
• Secant approximation methods for convex optimization
• An ϵ-Out-of-Kilter Method for Monotropic Programming
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Cited In (13)

• Production-inventory games and PMAS-games: Characterizations of the Owen point
• BIG BOSS INTERVAL GAMES
• Production-inventory games: A new class of totally balanced combinatorial optimization games
• On big boss grey games
• Fuzzy clan games and bi-monotonic allocation rules
• Multi-choice clan games and their core
• On big boss fuzzy interval games
• A core-allocation family for generalized holding cost games
• CONVEX GAMES VERSUS CLAN GAMES
• Marco A. López, a pioneer of continuous optimization in Spain
• Modeling cooperation on a class of distribution problems
• PRESERVING TRANSFER BENEFIT FOR PRESENT AND FUTURE GENERATIONS
• Necessary players and values

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