A core-allocation family for generalized holding cost games

DOI10.1007/s00186-006-0131-zzbMath1274.91050OpenAlexW2087936856MaRDI QIDQ2460041

Ana Meca

Publication date: 14 November 2007

Published in: Mathematical Methods of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00186-006-0131-z

zbMATH Keywords

cooperative gamescore allocationsgeneralized holding cost gamesinventory situationsminimum square proportional rule

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Inventory, storage, reservoirs (90B05)

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