Cores of inventory centralization games
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Publication:1566890
DOI10.1006/game.1999.0732zbMath0960.91008MaRDI QIDQ1566890
Shaked, Moshe, Moshe Dror, Bruce C. Hartman
Publication date: 11 May 2001
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1999.0732
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- Cores of convex games
- Note—Effects of Centralization on Expected Costs in a Multi-Location Newsboy Problem
