The \(\tau\)-value, the core and semiconvex games

DOI10.1007/BF01769310zbMath0582.90108MaRDI QIDQ1069867

Theo S. H. Driessen, S. H. Tijs

Publication date: 1985

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

Shapley value; core; nucleolus; gap function; exact game; characteristic function form; semiconvex game; \(\tau \) -value

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A12: Cooperative games

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Cites Work

• Game theory and the Tennessee Valley Authority
• A note on the exact games
• Cores of convex games
• Cores of exact games. I
• Income distribution and firm formation
• The Nucleolus of a Characteristic Function Game
• On the Nucleolus of a Characteristic Function Game
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