The \(\tau\)-value, the core and semiconvex games
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Publication:1069867
DOI10.1007/BF01769310zbMath0582.90108OpenAlexW1993715405MaRDI QIDQ1069867
S. H. Tijs, Theo S. H. Driessen
Publication date: 1985
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01769310
Shapley valuecorenucleolusgap functionexact gamecharacteristic function formsemiconvex game\(\tau \) -value
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