Income distribution and firm formation
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Publication:4199811
Cited in
(11)- Hypercubes and compromise values for cooperative fuzzy games.
- The aspiration approach to predicting coalition formation and payoff distribution in sidepayment games
- The epsilon core of a large replica game
- A demand adjustment process
- Dynamic club formation with coordination
- Market games and clubs
- In memoriam Elaine Bennett (1951-1995)
- Approximate cores of games and economies with clubs.
- Epsilon cores of games with limited side payments nonemptiness and equal treatment
- The \(\tau\)-value, the core and semiconvex games
- Some corrections to claims about the literature in Engl and Scotchmer (1996)
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