Income distribution and firm formation
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Publication:4199811
DOI10.1016/0147-5967(79)90032-5zbMATH Open0412.90023OpenAlexW2060638849MaRDI QIDQ4199811FDOQ4199811
Authors: Elaine Bennett, Myrna Wooders
Publication date: 1979
Published in: Journal of Comparative Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0147-5967(79)90032-5
income distributiontheory of the firmmarket entrycomparative economicsfirm formationalternative equilibrium conceptssocialist economy
Cited In (11)
- Epsilon cores of games with limited side payments nonemptiness and equal treatment
- Some corrections to claims about the literature in Engl and Scotchmer (1996)
- The epsilon core of a large replica game
- Approximate cores of games and economies with clubs.
- In memoriam Elaine Bennett (1951-1995)
- The aspiration approach to predicting coalition formation and payoff distribution in sidepayment games
- The \(\tau\)-value, the core and semiconvex games
- Hypercubes and compromise values for cooperative fuzzy games.
- Dynamic club formation with coordination
- A demand adjustment process
- Market games and clubs
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