Cooperation and competition in inventory games
In an inventory game, \(n\) agents agree to combine their orders, so as to save on pre-order costs. In an optimization model that takes into account the ordering costs and the storage costs, it can be proven that when each agent \(i\) submitted, on average, \(m_i\) orders per time unit, then the coalition of agents would need to make only \(m=\sqrt{\sum m_i^2}<\sum m_i\) orders. In this paper, the authors prove that the same estimate for \(m\) holds in a more realistic model in which we also take into account possible losses due to shortages (while waiting for the order to be fulfilled). For both models, the next natural question is: what is the fair way to distribute the ordering costs between the participating ordering agents. Previously, only a semi-heuristic cost allocation rule was known. The authors provide reasonable axioms for the cost allocation and prove that these axioms uniquely determine this allocation rule.
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- Modeling cooperation on a class of distribution problems
- Cores of inventory centralization games
- The proportional Shapley value and applications
- Collaborative shipping under different cost-sharing agreements
- Design and analysis of mechanisms for decentralized joint replenishment
- Collaborative replenishment in the presence of intermediaries
- A private contributions game for joint replenishment
- Cost allocation in inventory transportation systems
- Altruistic profit allocation rules for joint replenishment with carbon cap-and-trade policy
- Inventory games with quantity discount
- Enforcing fair cooperation in production-inventory settings with heterogeneous agents
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- Inventory games with permissible delay in payments
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- A cooperation model based on CVaR measure for a two-stage supply chain
- Owner–Intruder contests with correlated resource values
- On a Discounted Inventory Game
- Robust dynamic cooperative games
- Cooperative game theory and inventory management
- Incentive-compatible cost allocations for inventory games with private information
- Game of banks -- biform game theoretical framework for ATM network cost sharing
- A glimpse of some common concepts in algebras of logic and uncertain environments
- An optimization approach to coalition formation in centralized EOQ problems with additive transportation costs
- Renewal processes under coordination opportunities via robust dynamic coalitional games
- A note on coalitional manipulation and centralized inventory management
- \(p\)-additive games: a class of totally balanced games arising from inventory situations with temporary discounts
- Production-inventory games and PMAS-games: Characterizations of the Owen point
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