Alternative axiomatic characterizations of the Shapley and Banzhaf values
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Publication:1897343
DOI10.1007/BF01240041zbMath0838.90146MaRDI QIDQ1897343
Publication date: 30 May 1996
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
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Cites Work
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