Characterizations of the Deegan-Packel and Johnston power indices
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Publication:856236
DOI10.1016/J.EJOR.2005.08.025zbMATH Open1111.90340OpenAlexW1968735878MaRDI QIDQ856236FDOQ856236
Authors: M. G. Fiestras-Janeiro, S. Lorenzo-Freire, J. M. Alonso-Meijide, Balbina Casas-Méndez 
Publication date: 7 December 2006
Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2005.08.025
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Cites Work
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Monotonic solutions of cooperative games
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- On the uniqueness of the Shapley value
- Multilinear extensions and the banzhaf value
- Mathematical Properties of the Banzhaf Power Index
- Multilinear Extensions of Games
- A new index of power for simple n-person games
- Alternative axiomatic characterizations of the Shapley and Banzhaf values
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- Power indices for networks, with applications to matching markets
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- Axiomatization of some power indices in voting games with abstention
- Minimal-axiom characterizations of the Coleman and Banzhaf indices of voting power
- On the ordinal equivalence of the Jonhston, Banzhaf and Shapley-Shubik power indices for voting games with abstention
- Evaluation of decision power in multi-dimensional rules
- Power indices applied to Portuguese parliament
- A relation-algebraic approach to simple games
- Two new power indices based on winning coalitions
- A Review of Some Recent Results on Power Indices
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