Covering sets and a new Condorcet choice correspondence
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Publication:1107402
DOI10.1016/0022-0531(88)90096-8zbMATH Open0652.90013OpenAlexW1983254396MaRDI QIDQ1107402FDOQ1107402
Authors: Bhaskar Dutta 
Publication date: 1988
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(88)90096-8
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Cites Work
Cited In (50)
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- Minimal extending sets in tournaments
- Dynamic coalitional equilibrium
- King-chicken choice correspondences
- Preference-based choice functions: a generalized approach
- Minimal stable sets in tournaments
- Uncovered set choice rules
- Voting procedures, complexity of
- Coalitional stability with a credibility constraint
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- Choosing from a large tournament
- A survey on the complexity of tournament solutions
- Bounds for mixed strategy equilibria and the spatial model of elections
- A note on the McKelvey uncovered set and Pareto optimality
- Rational stability of choice functions
- Minimal covering set solutions
- An ordinal minimax theorem
- The Computational Complexity of Choice Sets
- Renegotiation perfection in infinite games
- An updated survey on the linear ordering problem for weighted or unweighted tournaments
- Choosing from a tournament
- A counterexample to a conjecture of Schwartz
- Weakened WARP and top-cycle choice rules
- Computing the minimal covering set
- Majority-approval social choice
- Individual choice under social influence
- The minimal covering set in large tournaments
- Representation in majority tournaments
- Set-rationalizable choice and self-stability
- Weak covering relations
- Extremal Restriction, Condorcet Sets, and Majority Decision Making
- Distributive politics and electoral competition
- Condorcet-consistent and approximately strategyproof tournament rules
- A new monotonicity condition for tournament solutions
- On the tournament equilibrium set
- Dynamic stable set as a tournament solution
- A survey on the linear ordering problem for weighted or unweighted tournaments
- The computational complexity of weak saddles
- A refinement of the uncovered set in tournaments
- The Copeland measure of Condorcet choice functions
- Condorcet choice correspondences: A set-theoretical comparison
- The supercovering relation, the pairwise winner, and more missing links between Borda and Condorcet
- Rank-based choice correspondences
- On the structure of stable tournament solutions
- Choosing from a weighted tournament
- Some Remarks on Dodgson's Voting Rule
- A new old solution for weak tournaments
- Von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set rationalization of choice functions
- Tournament solutions based on cooperative game theory
- Bounds on the disparity and separation of tournament solutions
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