Bounds on the disparity and separation of tournament solutions

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Cites work

A 16-vertex tournament for which Banks set and Slater set are disjoint
A branch-and-bound algorithm to solve the linear ordering problem for weighted tournaments
A computational analysis of the tournament equilibrium set
A smallest tournament for which the Banks set and the Copeland set are disjoint
A survey on the complexity of tournament solutions
A tournament of order 14 with disjoint Banks and Slater sets
Aggregation of Preferences with Variable Electorate
An updated survey on the linear ordering problem for weighted or unweighted tournaments
Banks winners in tournaments are difficult to recognize
Characterization of dominance relations in finite coalitional games
Choosing from a tournament
Computing the minimal covering set
Condorcet Social Choice Functions
Covering sets and a new Condorcet choice correspondence
Cyclic tournaments and cooperative majority voting: A solution
Depth-First Search and Linear Graph Algorithms
Dutta's minimal covering set and Shapley's saddles
Evaluation and decision models with multiple criteria. Stepping stones for the analyst.
Feedback vertex sets in tournaments
scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3972536 (Why is no real title available?)
scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1022238 (Why is no real title available?)
scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1855678 (Why is no real title available?)
scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3303831 (Why is no real title available?)
Matrix multiplication via arithmetic progressions
Minimal retentive sets in tournaments
Minimal stable sets in tournaments
On the tournament equilibrium set
Ranking Tournaments
Slater's winners of a tournament may not be in the Banks set
Sophisticated voting outcomes and agenda control
The bipartisan set of a tournament game
The Minimum Feedback Arc Set Problem is NP-Hard for Tournaments
Tournament games and positive tournaments
Tournament solutions and majority voting

Cited in

(12)

A survey on the complexity of tournament solutions
The bipartisan set of a tournament game
On the structure of stable tournament solutions
Margin of victory for tournament solutions
A smallest tournament for which the Banks set and the Copeland set are disjoint
Mixed refinements of Shapley's saddles and weak tournaments
Minimal extending sets in tournaments
On the discriminative power of tournament solutions
Improved bounds for minimal feedback vertex sets in tournaments
Strategic candidacy equilibria for common voting rules
The banks set and the bipartisan set may be disjoint
A tournament of order 14 with disjoint Banks and Slater sets

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