Computing the minimal covering set
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- A computational analysis of the tournament equilibrium set
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Cited in
(22)- The computational complexity of weak saddles
- The minimal covering set in large tournaments
- A note on the McKelvey uncovered set and Pareto optimality
- Bounds on the disparity and separation of tournament solutions
- Computing minimal extending sets by relation-algebraic modeling and development
- Efficiently computing minimal sets of critical pairs
- The complexity of minimum difference cover
- Constructing Minimal Coverability Sets
- The computational complexity of rationalizing boundedly rational choice behavior
- Complexity results for preference aggregation over \((m)\)CP-nets: max and rank voting
- Minimal covering set solutions
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- A new algorithm to find the smallest committee containing a given set of players
- The Computational Complexity of Choice Sets
- Control of Condorcet voting: complexity and a relation-algebraic approach
- Revealed Preference Tests of Collectively Rational Consumption Behavior: Formulations and Algorithms
- A natural adaptive process for collective decision-making
- Minimal retentive sets in tournaments
- Voting procedures, complexity of
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- Algorithms and Computation
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