Control of Condorcet voting: complexity and a relation-algebraic approach
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Publication:319803
DOI10.1016/J.EJOR.2015.04.025zbMATH Open1346.91069OpenAlexW1887172536MaRDI QIDQ319803FDOQ319803
Authors: Rudolf Berghammer, Henning Schnoor 
Publication date: 6 October 2016
Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2015.04.025
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Cites Work
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- Automated verification of relational while-programs
- Computing the minimal covering set
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