Strategic candidacy equilibria for common voting rules
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Cites work
- A dictionary for voting paradoxes
- A parameterized perspective on protecting elections
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- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3139273 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4005933 (Why is no real title available?)
- Independence of clones as a criterion for voting rules
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- Multimode control attacks on elections
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- New results on equilibria in strategic candidacy
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- Strategic Candidacy and Voting Procedures
- Strategic candidacy for multivalued voting procedures
- Strategic voting and strategic candidacy
- The complexity of controlling candidate-sequential elections
- Vote swapping in irresolute two-tier voting procedures
- Voting by successive elimination and strategic candidacy
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