Abstract: We propose a systematic methodology for defining tournament solutions as extensions of maximality. The central concepts of this methodology are maximal qualified subsets and minimal stable sets. We thus obtain an infinite hierarchy of tournament solutions, which encompasses the top cycle, the uncovered set, the Banks set, the minimal covering set, the tournament equilibrium set, the Copeland set, and the bipartisan set. Moreover, the hierarchy includes a new tournament solution, the minimal extending set, which is conjectured to refine both the minimal covering set and the Banks set.
Recommendations
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- The minimal covering set in large tournaments
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- On min-max pair in tournaments
- A Min-Max Theorem on Tournaments
- On the structure of stable tournament solutions
- On Sets of Consistent Arcs in a Tournament
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Cited in
(22)- Uncovered sets
- \(k\)-majority digraphs and the hardness of voting with a constant number of voters
- Minimal extending sets in tournaments
- Computing minimal extending sets by relation-algebraic modeling and development
- Rational stability of choice functions
- Set-monotonicity implies Kelly-strategyproofness
- Dominating, weakly stable, and uncovered sets: properties and generalizations
- Stable sets of weak tournaments
- Feedback vertex sets in tournaments
- Characterizing the top cycle via strategyproofness
- A counterexample to a conjecture of Schwartz
- Minimal retentive sets in tournaments
- The minimal covering set in large tournaments
- Set-rationalizable choice and self-stability
- Dynamic stable set as a tournament solution
- A refinement of the uncovered set in tournaments
- The number of tournaments with the minimum number of upsets
- Stable cores in information graph games
- On the structure of stable tournament solutions
- Von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set rationalization of choice functions
- Tournament solutions based on cooperative game theory
- Bounds on the disparity and separation of tournament solutions
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