Minimal stable sets in tournaments
From MaRDI portal
Publication:634517
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2011.05.004zbMath1247.91055arXiv0803.2138OpenAlexW2056670555MaRDI QIDQ634517
Publication date: 16 August 2011
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/0803.2138
Related Items (17)
A refinement of the uncovered set in tournaments ⋮ Minimal extending sets in tournaments ⋮ Tournament solutions based on cooperative game theory ⋮ Rational stability of choice functions ⋮ Characterizing the top cycle via strategyproofness ⋮ Computing minimal extending sets by relation-algebraic modeling and development ⋮ Set-monotonicity implies Kelly-strategyproofness ⋮ Von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set rationalization of choice functions ⋮ Set-rationalizable choice and self-stability ⋮ Feedback Vertex Sets in Tournaments ⋮ On the structure of stable tournament solutions ⋮ A counterexample to a conjecture of Schwartz ⋮ Uncovered sets ⋮ Minimal retentive sets in tournaments ⋮ \(k\)-majority digraphs and the hardness of voting with a constant number of voters ⋮ Stable cores in information graph games ⋮ Bounds on the disparity and separation of tournament solutions
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- On the possibility of reasonable consistent majoritarian choice: Some positive results
- Still more on the tournament equilibrium set
- Evaluation and decision models with multiple criteria. Stepping stones for the analyst.
- Cyclic tournaments and cooperative majority voting: A solution
- A computational analysis of the tournament equilibrium set
- Characterization of dominance relations in finite coalitional games
- Sophisticated voting outcomes and agenda control
- Choosing from a tournament
- Covering sets and a new Condorcet choice correspondence
- Strategy subsets closed under rational behavior
- The bipartisan set of a tournament game
- Tournament solutions and majority voting
- Dutta's minimal covering set and Shapley's saddles
- Banks winners in tournaments are difficult to recognize
- Non-cooperative games
- Feedback Vertex Sets in Tournaments
- Consistency, Rationality and Collective Choice
- Condorcet Social Choice Functions
- Tournament games and positive tournaments
- Aggregation of Preferences with Variable Electorate
This page was built for publication: Minimal stable sets in tournaments
