Cyclic tournaments and cooperative majority voting: A solution

DOI10.1007/BF01832917zbMath0698.90008OpenAlexW2035165846MaRDI QIDQ912750

N. E. Zubov

Publication date: 1990

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01832917

zbMATH Keywords

social choicecooperative bargainingcooperative majority votingpredictive strengthretentivenessTournament Equilibrium Set

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Social choice (91B14)

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