Condorcet-consistent and approximately strategyproof tournament rules
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Publication:4638087
DOI10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2017.35zbMath1402.91125arXiv1605.09733OpenAlexW2962709587MaRDI QIDQ4638087
S. Matthew Weinberg, Jon Schneider, Ariel Schvartzman
Publication date: 3 May 2018
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1605.09733
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Cites Work
- Can strategizing in round-robin subtournaments be avoided?
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- Condorcet Social Choice Functions
- Social Choice Scoring Functions
- Handbook of Computational Social Choice
- Who Can Win a Single-Elimination Tournament?
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