Choosing from a large tournament
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Publication:1024772
DOI10.1007/S00355-007-0279-3zbMATH Open1163.91345OpenAlexW2134014252MaRDI QIDQ1024772FDOQ1024772
Publication date: 17 June 2009
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-007-0279-3
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- Choosing from a tournament
- Condorcet choice correspondences: A set-theoretical comparison
- A Random Voting Graph Almost Surely has a Hamiltonian Cycle when the Number of Alternatives is Large
- Majority voting solution concepts and redistributive taxation
Cited In (12)
- Robust bounds on choosing from large tournaments
- Condorcet choice correspondences for weak tournaments
- Computing minimal extending sets by relation-algebraic modeling and development
- Choice using cyclic tournament relations
- Who Can Win a Single-Elimination Tournament?
- The likelihood of a Condorcet winner in the logrolling setting
- Robust bounds on choosing from large tournaments
- On the Discriminative Power of Tournament Solutions
- Margin of victory for tournament solutions
- The minimal covering set in large tournaments
- On the structure of stable tournament solutions
- Choosing from a weighted tournament
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