Choosing from a large tournament
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Publication:1024772
DOI10.1007/s00355-007-0279-3zbMath1163.91345OpenAlexW2134014252MaRDI QIDQ1024772
Publication date: 17 June 2009
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-007-0279-3
Related Items (9)
Who Can Win a Single-Elimination Tournament? ⋮ Computing minimal extending sets by relation-algebraic modeling and development ⋮ The likelihood of a Condorcet winner in the logrolling setting ⋮ On the structure of stable tournament solutions ⋮ The minimal covering set in large tournaments ⋮ On the Discriminative Power of Tournament Solutions ⋮ Robust bounds on choosing from large tournaments ⋮ Margin of victory for tournament solutions ⋮ Robust bounds on choosing from large tournaments
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