Weakened WARP and top-cycle choice rules

DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2007.05.004zbMath1141.91358MaRDI QIDQ2468509

Lars Ehlers, Yves Sprumont

Publication date: 24 January 2008

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2007.05.004

zbMATH Keywords

top cycle; context independence; weakened WARP

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91B06: Decision theory

91B14: Social choice

Related Items

Non-existence of continuous choice functions, A foundation for strategic agenda voting, Uncovered bargaining solutions, Minimal covering set solutions, State dependent choice, Reason-based choice correspondences, Uncovered set choice rules, The computational complexity of rationalizing boundedly rational choice behavior, Common characterizations of the untrapped set and the top cycle, Partially dominant choice

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