Extremal Restriction, Condorcet Sets, and Majority Decision Making

DOI10.1007/978-3-642-02865-6_5zbMath1331.91076OpenAlexW127320581MaRDI QIDQ2787397

M. Elena Sáiz, Adrian Van Deemen

Publication date: 25 February 2016

Published in: Theory and Decision Library C (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-02865-6_5

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Cites Work

• Condorcet's paradox
• Optimal location of candidates in ideological space
• Pairwise symmetry conditions for voting equilibria
• Craven's conjecture
• Notes on Craven's conjecture
• Intransitivities in multidimensional voting models and some implications for agenda control
• General concepts of value restriction and preference majority
• Condorcet’s Paradox
• A Possibility Theorem on Majority Decisions
• The Simple Majority Decision Rule
• Social Preference Orderings and Majority Rule
• On a Class of Equilibrium Conditions for Majority Rule
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