Circumstantial Power: Some Hints for Finding Optimal Persuadable or Bribable Voters

DOI10.1007/978-3-642-35929-3_17MaRDI QIDQ4644765zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Montserrat Pons, Josep Freixas

Publication date 8 January 2019

Published in Power, Voting, and Voting Power: 30 Years After (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-35929-3_17

zbMATH Keywords

local poweroptimal bribable votersoptimal persuadable voters

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 15325 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1470897 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3078997 (Why is no real title available?)
• A CLASS OF MAJORITY GAMES
• Circumstantial power: Optimal persuadable voters
• Inferior players in simple games
• Multilinear Extensions of Games
• Multilinear extensions and the banzhaf value
• On the uniqueness of the Shapley value

Cited in

(1)

• Circumstantial power: Optimal persuadable voters

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