Circumstantial Power: Some Hints for Finding Optimal Persuadable or Bribable Voters
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Publication:4644765
DOI10.1007/978-3-642-35929-3_17zbMATH Open1419.91249OpenAlexW42810619MaRDI QIDQ4644765FDOQ4644765
Authors: Montserrat Pons, Josep Freixas 
Publication date: 8 January 2019
Published in: Power, Voting, and Voting Power: 30 Years After (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-35929-3_17
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Cites Work
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- On the uniqueness of the Shapley value
- Multilinear extensions and the banzhaf value
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- Multilinear Extensions of Games
- A CLASS OF MAJORITY GAMES
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- Circumstantial power: Optimal persuadable voters
- Inferior players in simple games
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