scientific article; zbMATH DE number 15325

zbMATH Open0754.90078MaRDI QIDQ3971973FDOQ3971973

Authors: Philip D. jun. Straffin 

Publication date: 25 June 1992

Title of this publication is not available (Why is that?)

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zbMATH Keywords

Shapley-Shubik indexBanzhaf power indicesprobability model

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Cooperative games (91A12) Voting theory (91B12)

Cited In (26)

• Mathematical Properties of the Banzhaf Power Index
• Axiomatizations for the Shapley-Shubik power index for games with several levels of approval in the input and output
• Approximations to the Banzhaf Index of Voting Power
• A theorem connecting Shapley-Owen power scores and the radius of the yolk in two dimensions
• A characterization and some properties of the Banzhaf-Coleman-Dubey-Shapley sensitivity index
• A decisiveness index for simple games
• Circumstantial Power: Some Hints for Finding Optimal Persuadable or Bribable Voters
• Correlation, partitioning and the probability of casting a decisive vote under the majority rule
• On the ordinal equivalence of the Johnston, Banzhaf and Shapley power indices
• The exact bias of the Banzhaf measure of power when votes are neither equiprobable nor independent
• Probabilistic implications of the assumption of homogeneity in voting games
• Negotiating team formation using deep reinforcement learning
• On the not-preference-based Hoede-Bakker index
• Potential, value, and coalition formation
• Weighted Banzhaf power and interaction indexes through weighted approximations of games
• A note on voting
• On the Nucleolus as a Power Index
• Circumstantial power: Optimal persuadable voters
• The Owen and Shapley spatial power indices: a comparison and a generalization
• The modified Banzhaf value for games with coalition structure: An axiomatic characterization.
• Shapley and Banzhaf Values as Probability Transformations
• Semivalues as power indices.
• An asymmetric Shapley-Shubik power index
• Power distribution in the Basque parliament using games with externalities
• Monte Carlo methods for the Shapley-Shubik power index
• Consecutive amalgamations and an axiomatization of the Shapley value

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