scientific article; zbMATH DE number 15325
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Publication:3971973
zbMATH Open0754.90078MaRDI QIDQ3971973FDOQ3971973
Publication date: 25 June 1992
Title of this publication is not available (Why is that?)
Cited In (21)
- Axiomatizations for the Shapley-Shubik power index for games with several levels of approval in the input and output
- A theorem connecting Shapley-Owen power scores and the radius of the yolk in two dimensions
- A characterization and some properties of the Banzhaf-Coleman-Dubey-Shapley sensitivity index
- A decisiveness index for simple games
- Circumstantial Power: Some Hints for Finding Optimal Persuadable or Bribable Voters
- Correlation, partitioning and the probability of casting a decisive vote under the majority rule
- On the ordinal equivalence of the Johnston, Banzhaf and Shapley power indices
- The exact bias of the Banzhaf measure of power when votes are neither equiprobable nor independent
- Negotiating team formation using deep reinforcement learning
- Potential, value, and coalition formation
- Weighted Banzhaf power and interaction indexes through weighted approximations of games
- A note on voting
- On the Nucleolus as a Power Index
- Circumstantial power: Optimal persuadable voters
- The Owen and Shapley spatial power indices: a comparison and a generalization
- The modified Banzhaf value for games with coalition structure: An axiomatic characterization.
- Shapley and Banzhaf Values as Probability Transformations
- Semivalues as power indices.
- Power distribution in the Basque parliament using games with externalities
- Monte Carlo methods for the Shapley-Shubik power index
- Consecutive amalgamations and an axiomatization of the Shapley value
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