Power distribution in the Basque parliament using games with externalities

DOI10.1007/s11238-020-09748-2zbMath1471.91437OpenAlexW3010199013MaRDI QIDQ2202229

G. Arévalo-Iglesias, M. Álvarez-Mozos

Publication date: 17 September 2020

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/2445/170245

zbMATH Keywords

plurality rulesimple gamesexternalitiespower indices

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Voting theory (91B12) History, political science (91F10)

Cites Work

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• How Can Cooperative Game Theory Be Made More Relevant to Economics? : An Open Problem
• Marginal Contributions and Externalities in the Value
• Mathematical Properties of the Banzhaf Power Index
• N‐person games in partition function form

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