The exact bias of the Banzhaf measure of power when votes are neither equiprobable nor independent
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Publication:1024771
DOI10.1007/S00355-007-0280-XzbMATH Open1163.91343OpenAlexW2054890293MaRDI QIDQ1024771FDOQ1024771
Authors: Serguei Kaniovski 
Publication date: 17 June 2009
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-007-0280-x
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Cites Work
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- Multilinear Extensions of Games
- A note on the probability of casting a decisive vote
- Condorcet's jury theorem, dependency among jurors
- The mathematics and statistics of voting power
- Equal representation in two-tier voting systems
- Modeling large electorates with Fourier series, with applications to Nash equilibria in proximity and directional models of spatial competition
- Fair Apportionment and the Banzhaf Index
- Probabilistic Voting Power in the EU Council: The Cases of Trade Policy and Social Regulation
Cited In (11)
- Voting power: an information theory approach
- Aggregation of correlated votes and Condorcet's jury theorem
- How Often Are You Decisive: an Enquiry About the Pivotality of Voting Rules
- A note on the direct democracy deficit in two-tier voting
- A Test of the Marginalist Defense of the Rational Voter Hypothesis Using Quantile Regression
- Fair representation and a linear Shapley rule
- Heuristic and exact solutions to the inverse power index problem for small voting bodies
- Probability of majority inversion with three states and interval preferences
- An invariance result for homogeneous juries with correlated votes
- Bounds on the competence of a homogeneous jury
- Measuring voting power in games with correlated votes using Bahadur's parametrisation
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