The exact bias of the Banzhaf measure of power when votes are neither equiprobable nor independent
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Publication:1024771
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 638138 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1470897 (Why is no real title available?)
- A note on the probability of casting a decisive vote
- Condorcet's jury theorem, dependency among jurors
- Equal representation in two-tier voting systems
- Fair Apportionment and the Banzhaf Index
- Modeling large electorates with Fourier series, with applications to Nash equilibria in proximity and directional models of spatial competition
- Multilinear Extensions of Games
- Probabilistic Voting Power in the EU Council: The Cases of Trade Policy and Social Regulation
- The mathematics and statistics of voting power
Cited in
(11)- A note on the direct democracy deficit in two-tier voting
- How Often Are You Decisive: an Enquiry About the Pivotality of Voting Rules
- Fair representation and a linear Shapley rule
- Voting power: an information theory approach
- Probability of majority inversion with three states and interval preferences
- A test of the marginalist defense of the rational voter hypothesis using quantile regression
- An invariance result for homogeneous juries with correlated votes
- Heuristic and exact solutions to the inverse power index problem for small voting bodies
- Measuring voting power in games with correlated votes using Bahadur's parametrisation
- Bounds on the competence of a homogeneous jury
- Aggregation of correlated votes and Condorcet's jury theorem
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