Power index axiomatics in the problem of voting with quota

DOI10.1134/S0005117911030106zbMATH Open1226.91016OpenAlexW1970024651MaRDI QIDQ647775FDOQ647775

Authors: Mikhail Batsyn, Valery A. Kalyagin 

Publication date: 24 November 2011

Published in: Automation and Remote Control (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1134/s0005117911030106

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Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

Cites Work

• Achievable hierarchies in voting games
• Mathematical Properties of the Banzhaf Power Index
• Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf indices revisited.
• Boundary relations, graphs and collective solutions

Cited In (7)

• Axiomatics for power indices that account for player preferences
• Powers of subgroups in voting bodies
• The minimum sum representation as an index of voting power
• The exact bias of the Banzhaf measure of power when votes are neither equiprobable nor independent
• Minimal-axiom characterizations of the Coleman and Banzhaf indices of voting power
• Compound voting and the Banzhaf index
• Axiomatics for power indices in the weighted games

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