Power index axiomatics in the problem of voting with quota

DOI10.1134/S0005117911030106MaRDI QIDQ647775zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Mikhail Batsyn, Valery A. Kalyagin

Publication date 24 November 2011

Published in Automation and Remote Control (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1134/s0005117911030106

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

Recommendations

• Axiomatics for power indices that account for player preferences
• Power indices of players in systems with weighted voting
• Compound voting and the Banzhaf index
• Axiomatics for power indices in the weighted games
• Ranking players by ``power in weighted voting systems: The multi-relation method

Cites work

• Achievable hierarchies in voting games
• Boundary relations, graphs and collective solutions
• Mathematical Properties of the Banzhaf Power Index
• Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf indices revisited.

Cited in

(7)

• The exact bias of the Banzhaf measure of power when votes are neither equiprobable nor independent
• Minimal-axiom characterizations of the Coleman and Banzhaf indices of voting power
• Axiomatics for power indices that account for player preferences
• Compound voting and the Banzhaf index
• The minimum sum representation as an index of voting power
• Axiomatics for power indices in the weighted games
• Powers of subgroups in voting bodies

This page was built for publication: Power index axiomatics in the problem of voting with quota

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q647775)