A note on the probability of casting a decisive vote
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- Dimensions of election procedures: Analyses and comparisons
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- The mathematics and statistics of voting power
- Pivotal players and the characterization of influence
- Fair representation and a linear Shapley rule
- Truth-revealing voting rules for large populations
- The theoretical Shapley-Shubik probability of an election inversion in a toy symmetric version of the US presidential electoral system
- Welfarist evaluations of decision rules under interstate utility dependencies
- A model of pre-electoral coalition formation
- Measuring voting power in games with correlated votes using Bahadur's parametrisation
- A model of electoral competition with abstaining voters
- Correlation, partitioning and the probability of casting a decisive vote under the majority rule
- A test of the marginalist defense of the rational voter hypothesis using quantile regression
- “One Man, One Vote” Part 1: Electoral Justice in the U.S. Electoral College: Banzhaf and Shapley/Shubik Versus May
- Information aggregation failure in a model of social mobility
- Equal representation in two-tier voting systems
- The fragility of information aggregation in large elections
- Altruism and voting: a large-turnout result that does not rely on civic duty or cooperative behavior
- Groups can make a difference: voting power measures extended
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