Information aggregation failure in a model of social mobility

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2016.09.006zbMath1394.91111OpenAlexW2528901763MaRDI QIDQ516993

Avidit Acharya

Publication date: 16 March 2017

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2016.09.006

zbMATH Keywords

social mobilityinformation aggregationstrategic votingredistributive politics

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) History, political science (91F10)

Related Items

Wisdom of the crowd? Information aggregation in representative democracy, Information structures and information aggregation in threshold equilibria in elections, Using cheap talk to polarize or unify a group of decision makers, Truth-revealing voting rules for large populations, Polarization and inefficient information aggregation under strategic voting, Voting on tricky questions

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• Social Mobility and Redistributive Politics