Using cheap talk to polarize or unify a group of decision makers
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1729665
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2018.12.002zbMath1419.91141OpenAlexW2737191121MaRDI QIDQ1729665
Publication date: 28 February 2019
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://papers.bok.or.kr/RePEc_attach/wpaper/english/wp-2017-19.pdf
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