Fragility of asymptotic agreement under Bayesian learning
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Publication:4586071
DOI10.3982/TE436zbMATH Open1395.91094OpenAlexW610908415MaRDI QIDQ4586071FDOQ4586071
Authors: Daron Acemoglu, Victor Chernozhukov, Muhamet Yildiz
Publication date: 11 September 2018
Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/te436
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