Recommendations
Cites work
- Agreeing to disagree
- Approximating agreeing to disagree results with common \(p\)-beliefs
- Approximating common knowledge with common beliefs
- Bad Reputation
- Common knowledge and consensus with noisy communication
- Communication, consensus, and knowledge
- Convergence to agreement and the role of public information
- Dynamic coordination via organizational routines
- Endogenous information acquisition in Bayesian games with strategic complementarities
- Forgetful updating and stubborn decision-makers
- Fragility of asymptotic agreement under Bayesian learning
- Inattention and belief polarization
- Learning to agree
- Persuasion Bias, Social Influence, and Unidimensional Opinions
- Professional advice
- Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
- Robust multiplicity with a grain of naiveté
- Secret information acquisition in Cournot markets
- Some extensions of a claim of Aumann in an axiomatic model of knowledge
- Stochastic orders
- Trade with Heterogeneous Prior Beliefs and Asymmetric Information
- We can't disagree forever
- When is reputation bad?
This page was built for publication: Talking with an extremist
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q6559100)