Managerial manipulation, corporate governance, and limited market participation

DOI10.1016/J.JEDC.2017.12.004zbMATH Open1401.91589OpenAlexW2776811422MaRDI QIDQ1657308FDOQ1657308

Authors: Qi Liu, Bo Sun 

Publication date: 13 August 2018

Published in: Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jedc.2017.12.004

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zbMATH Keywords

corporate governanceaccounting standardslimited stock market participationmanagerial manipulation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Corporate finance (dividends, real options, etc.) (91G50) Financial applications of other theories (91G80)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Fragility of asymptotic agreement under Bayesian learning
• Rational beliefs and endogenous uncertainty
• Speculative Investor Behavior in a Stock Market with Heterogeneous Expectations
• Liquidity and market participation

Cited In (2)

• Limited asset market participation and fiscal sustainability
• Stakeholder Governance, Competition, and Firm Value*

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