Correlation, partitioning and the probability of casting a decisive vote under the majority rule
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Cites work
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- A Polynomial Time Algorithm for Counting Integral Points in Polyhedra When the Dimension is Fixed
- A Weighted Voting Model
- A central limit theorem for m-dependent random variables with unbounded m
- A note on the probability of casting a decisive vote
- Analytic combinatorics
- Computing the Continuous Discretely
- On Ehrhart polynomials and probability calculations in voting theory
- On Local Limit Theorem for Integer-Valued Random Variables
- Polynômes arithmétiques et méthode des polyedres en combinatoire
- Probability Integrals of Multivariate Normal and Multivariate $t^1$
- Probability calculations under the IAC hypothesis
- Sur un probl?me de g?om?trie diophantienne lin?aire. I. Poly?dres et r?seaux.
- Voter Antagonism and the Paradox of Voting
Cited in
(7)- On the probability to act in the European Union
- Modelling dependence in simple and indirect majority systems
- The theoretical Shapley-Shubik probability of an election inversion in a toy symmetric version of the US presidential electoral system
- Counting votes in coupled decisions. An efficient method for counting votes in coupled decisions with multiple inequality restrictions
- “One Man, One Vote” Part 1: Electoral Justice in the U.S. Electoral College: Banzhaf and Shapley/Shubik Versus May
- Exploring the No-Show Paradox for Condorcet Extensions
- Estimating the Probability of Events That Have Never Occurred: When Is Your Vote Decisive?
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