Measuring voting power in games with correlated votes using Bahadur's parametrisation
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2353695
DOI10.1007/S00355-014-0831-XzbMATH Open1318.91022OpenAlexW2121960347MaRDI QIDQ2353695FDOQ2353695
Sreejith Das, Serguei Kaniovski
Publication date: 16 July 2015
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-014-0831-x
Recommendations
- The exact bias of the Banzhaf measure of power when votes are neither equiprobable nor independent
- Comparing two ways of measuring the power of party members in simple majority voting games
- Postulates and paradoxes of relative voting power -- A critical re-appraisal
- Power analysis of voting by count and account
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 509221
Cites Work
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- A note on the probability of casting a decisive vote
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- A Full Likelihood Procedure for Analysing Exchangable Binary Data
- The exact bias of the Banzhaf measure of power when votes are neither equiprobable nor independent
- Optimal jury design for homogeneous juries with correlated votes
- Fair Apportionment and the Banzhaf Index
- Estimating the Probability of Events That Have Never Occurred: When Is Your Vote Decisive?
- A probabilistic synopsis of binary decision rules
Cited In (6)
- Circumstantial Power: Some Hints for Finding Optimal Persuadable or Bribable Voters
- The blocker postulates for measures of voting power
- The exact bias of the Banzhaf measure of power when votes are neither equiprobable nor independent
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Probability of majority inversion with three states and interval preferences
- A Banzhaf value for games with a proximity relation among the agents
This page was built for publication: Measuring voting power in games with correlated votes using Bahadur's parametrisation
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2353695)
