Measuring voting power in games with correlated votes using Bahadur's parametrisation
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Publication:2353695
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3169075 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1470897 (Why is no real title available?)
- A Full Likelihood Procedure for Analysing Exchangable Binary Data
- A note on the probability of casting a decisive vote
- A probabilistic synopsis of binary decision rules
- Estimating the Probability of Events That Have Never Occurred: When Is Your Vote Decisive?
- Fair Apportionment and the Banzhaf Index
- Optimal jury design for homogeneous juries with correlated votes
- The exact bias of the Banzhaf measure of power when votes are neither equiprobable nor independent
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(8)- Circumstantial Power: Some Hints for Finding Optimal Persuadable or Bribable Voters
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6938747 (Why is no real title available?)
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- The conditional Shapley-Shubik measure for ternary voting games
- Comparing two ways of measuring the power of party members in simple majority voting games
- Probability of majority inversion with three states and interval preferences
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- A Banzhaf value for games with a proximity relation among the agents
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