An asymmetric Shapley-Shubik power index

DOI10.1007/S00182-006-0011-ZMaRDI QIDQ2501063zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Xingwei Hu

Publication date 4 September 2006

Published in International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-006-0011-z

zbMATH Keywords

Banzhaf power indexsimple game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Voting theory (91B12)

Review text

In this paper the Banzhaf and the Shapley-Shubik power indices for simple games are extended. The author considers voting situations in which each voter has two possible choices: voting or not for a bill. In these situations, to measure the power of a voter, it is not only important to take into account his capacity to favour the bill when he wants it to pass, but also his capacity to block the bill when he wants to block it. Using this idea and assuming that there is a probability distribution on the set of bipartitions \(\{ (T,N\setminus T) | T\subseteq N\}\), \(T\) being the set of voters that support the bill, the author extends the Banzhaf and the Shapley-Shubik power indices and studies some properties and relations of the new indices.

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Cites work

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Cited in

(22)

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• The bicameral postulates and indices of a priori voting power
• On authority distributions in organizations: Equilibrium.
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• Axiomatizations for the Shapley-Shubik power index for games with several levels of approval in the input and output
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• PARTY POWER IN THE HOUSE OF COUNCILORS IN JAPAN : AN APPLICATION OF THE NONSYMMETRIC SHAPLEY-OWEN INDEX
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• A theory of dichotomous valuation with applications to variable selection
• Banzhaf-Coleman-Dubey-Shapley sensitivity index for simple multichoice voting games
• IMPORTANCE IN SYSTEMS WITH INTERVAL DECISIONS
• A dichotomous analysis of unemployment benefits
• Protectionism and blocking power indices

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