An asymmetric Shapley-Shubik power index (Q2501063)

In this paper the Banzhaf and the Shapley-Shubik power indices for simple games are extended. The author considers voting situations in which each voter has two possible choices: voting or not for a bill. In these situations, to measure the power of a voter, it is not only important to take into account his capacity to favour the bill when he wants it to pass, but also his capacity to block the bill when he wants to block it. Using this idea and assuming that there is a probability distribution on the set of bipartitions \(\{ (T,N\setminus T) | T\subseteq N\}\), \(T\) being the set of voters that support the bill, the author extends the Banzhaf and the Shapley-Shubik power indices and studies some properties and relations of the new indices.