IMPORTANCE IN SYSTEMS WITH INTERVAL DECISIONS

DOI10.1142/S0219525918500248MaRDI QIDQ6203292zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Sascha Kurz

Publication date 27 March 2024

Published in Advances in Complex Systems (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://arxiv.org/abs/1803.04138

zbMATH Keywords

importanceinfluenceinterval decisionsPenrose-Banzhaf indexpowerShapley-Shubik indexstate aggregation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Game theory, economics, finance, and other social and behavioral sciences (91-XX)

Abstract: Given a system where the real-valued states of the agents are aggregated by a function to a real-valued state of the entire system, we are interested in the influence or importance of the different agents for that function. This generalizes the notion of power indices for binary voting systems to decisions over interval policy spaces and has applications in economics, engineering, security analysis, and other disciplines. Here, we study the question of importance in systems with interval decisions. Based on the classical Shapley-Shubik and Penrose-Banzhaf index, from binary voting, we motivate and analyze two importance measures. Additionally, we present some results for parametric classes of aggregation functions.

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Cited in

(1)

• Axiomatizations for the Shapley-Shubik power index for games with several levels of approval in the input and output

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