The influence relation for ternary voting games

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2012.02.007MaRDI QIDQ423762zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Cameron Parker

Publication date 4 June 2012

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2012.02.007

zbMATH Keywords

cooperative gameshierarchiesordinal equivalenceternary voting games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Voting theory (91B12)

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Cites work

• A class of simple games
• Achievable hierarchies in voting games
• Anonymous yes-no voting with abstention and multiple levels of approval
• Can an asymmetric power structure always be achieved?
• Circumstantial power: Optimal persuadable voters
• Complete simple games
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1470897 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1357433 (Why is no real title available?)
• On ordinal equivalence of power measures given by regular semivalues
• On ordinal equivalence of the Shapley and Banzhaf values for cooperative games
• Ordinal equivalence of power notions in voting games
• Political influence in multi-choice institutions: cyclicity, anonymity, and transitivity
• Simple majority achievable hierarchies
• Stability of decision systems under majority rule
• Ternary voting games
• Voters' power in voting games with abstention: Influence relation and ordinal equivalence of power theories
• Weighted voting, abstention, and multiple levels of approval

Cited in

(18)

• Ternary voting games
• The conditional Shapley-Shubik measure for ternary voting games
• Properties of ladder tournaments
• On the ordinal equivalence of the Jonhston, Banzhaf and Shapley-Shubik power indices for voting games with abstention
• A critical analysis on the notion of power
• A note on the ordinal equivalence of power indices in games with coalition structure
• Round-robin political tournaments: abstention, truthful equilibria, and effective power
• Achievable hierarchies in voting games with abstention
• Abstentions in the German Bundesrat and ternary decision rules in weighted voting systems
• Power in voting rules with abstention: an axiomatization of a two components power index
• Early warning indicators of epidemics on a coupled behaviour-disease model with vaccine hesitance and incomplete data
• Influence relation in two-output multichoice voting games
• Political influence in multi-choice institutions: cyclicity, anonymity, and transitivity
• Axiomatization of some power indices in voting games with abstention
• All power structures are achievable in basic weighted games
• Rationing to avoid conflict: a centralized assignment problem
• Manipulation in games with multiple levels of output
• Voters' power in voting games with abstention: Influence relation and ordinal equivalence of power theories

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