Manipulation in games with multiple levels of output
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 44383 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3400720 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3106184 (Why is no real title available?)
- A Possibility Theorem on Majority Decisions
- A spatial model of political competition and proportional representation
- Advances in the spatial theory of voting.
- Anonymous yes-no voting with abstention and multiple levels of approval
- Generalized average rules as stable Nash mechanisms to implement generalized median rules
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- Mathematics and Politics
- Political influence in multi-choice institutions: cyclicity, anonymity, and transitivity
- Stability of decision systems under majority rule
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
- Ternary voting games
- The influence relation for ternary voting games
- Weighted voting, abstention, and multiple levels of approval
Cited in
(8)- On anonymous and weighted voting systems
- The conditional Shapley-Shubik measure for ternary voting games
- A manipulation game based on Machiavellian strategies
- Manipulation in Games
- The Shapley-Shubik power index for dichotomous multi-type games
- Power in voting rules with abstention: an axiomatization of a two components power index
- Round-robin political tournaments: abstention, truthful equilibria, and effective power
- Dichotomous multi-type games with a coalition structure
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