Bargaining and regulation with asymmetric information about demand and supply
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Publication:1115823
DOI10.1016/0022-0531(88)90003-8zbMath0664.90101MaRDI QIDQ1115823
Publication date: 1988
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(88)90003-8
asymmetric information; bargaining; incomplete information; incentive compatibility; direct revelation game; rate regulation process
Related Items
Optimal trading mechanisms with ex ante unidentified traders, Bargaining and regulation with asymmetric information about demand and supply, Efficient allocation with continuous quantities, Bargaining and collusion in a regulatory relationship
Cites Work
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