Strategic and structural uncertainty in robust implementation

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2015.06.005zbMath1330.91104OpenAlexW1925812931MaRDI QIDQ900423

Takuro Yamashita

Publication date: 22 December 2015

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2015.06.005

zbMATH Keywords

implementationrobust implementationstrategic and structural uncertainty

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Social choice (91B14)

Cites Work

• Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
• Robust implementation in general mechanisms
• A crash course in implementation theory
• Interactive Epistemology and Solution Concepts for Games with Asymmetric Information
• The Limits of ex post Implementation
• Asymmetric Information Bargaining Problems with Many Agents
• Robust Implementation in Direct Mechanisms
• Rationalizability and Correlated Equilibria
• Optimal Auction Design
• Implementation in Undominated Strategies: A Look at Bounded Mechanisms
• Robust mechanism design and dominant strategy voting rules
• Implementation in Weakly Undominated Strategies: Optimality of Second-Price Auction and Posted-Price Mechanism: Figure 1
• An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design
• Robust Mechanism Design
• Foundations of Dominant-Strategy Mechanisms
• Admissibility in Games
• Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model

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