Strategic and structural uncertainty in robust implementation
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Publication:900423
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2015.06.005zbMath1330.91104OpenAlexW1925812931MaRDI QIDQ900423
Publication date: 22 December 2015
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2015.06.005
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