Informational smallness and the scope for limiting information rents

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2010.07.007zbMATH Open1203.91083OpenAlexW3125226427MaRDI QIDQ617679FDOQ617679

Authors: Alia Gizatulina, Martin Hellwig 

Publication date: 13 January 2011

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2010.07.007

Recommendations

• Private information in large economies
• Informational size and incentive compatibility with aggregate uncertainty.
• Informational Size and Incentive Compatibility
• Informational smallness in rational expectations equilibria.
• On the production and distribution of information

zbMATH Keywords

mechanism designpublic goodsuniversal type spacesurplus extractionBDPcorrelated informationinformational smallness

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economics of information (91B44) Public goods (91B18)

Cites Work

• Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Asymmetric Information Bargaining Problems with Many Agents
• On the Generic (Im)Possibility of Full Surplus Extraction in Mechanism Design
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Correlated Information and Mecanism Design
• Informational Size and Incentive Compatibility
• Implementation in differential information economies
• Mechanism design with multidimensional, continuous types and interdependent valuations
• The relevance of private information in mechanism design
• Continuity in auction design
• Private information in large economies
• Beliefs, payoffs, information: on the robustness of the BDP property in models with endogenous beliefs
• Surplus extraction and competition
• Asymptotic Efficiency in Large Exchange Economies With Asymmetric Information

Cited In (3)

• Mechanism design with ambiguous transfers: an analysis in finite dimensional naive type spaces
• Private information in large economies
• Beliefs, payoffs, information: on the robustness of the BDP property in models with endogenous beliefs

This page was built for publication: Informational smallness and the scope for limiting information rents

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q617679)