Informational smallness and the scope for limiting information rents

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2010.07.007zbMath1203.91083OpenAlexW3125226427MaRDI QIDQ617679

Alia Gizatulina, Martin F. Hellwig

Publication date: 13 January 2011

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2010.07.007

zbMATH Keywords

public goodsmechanism designuniversal type spacesurplus extractionBDPcorrelated informationinformational smallness

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Public goods (91B18) Economics of information (91B44)

Related Items (2)

Beliefs, payoffs, information: on the robustness of the BDP property in models with endogenous beliefs ⋮ Mechanism design with ambiguous transfers: an analysis in finite dimensional naive type spaces

Cites Work

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• Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions
• Correlated Information and Mecanism Design
• Asymptotic Efficiency in Large Exchange Economies With Asymmetric Information
• On the Generic (Im)Possibility of Full Surplus Extraction in Mechanism Design
• Informational Size and Incentive Compatibility

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