Informational smallness and the scope for limiting information rents

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2010.07.007MaRDI QIDQ617679zbMATHOpenAlexFDO

Authors Alia Gizatulina, Martin Hellwig

Publication date 13 January 2011

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2010.07.007

zbMATH Keywords

mechanism designpublic goodsuniversal type spacesurplus extractionBDPcorrelated informationinformational smallness

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economics of information (91B44) Public goods (91B18)

Recommendations

• Private information in large economies
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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 193012 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3547015 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3337815 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3085434 (Why is no real title available?)
• Asymmetric Information Bargaining Problems with Many Agents
• Asymptotic Efficiency in Large Exchange Economies With Asymmetric Information
• Beliefs, payoffs, information: on the robustness of the BDP property in models with endogenous beliefs
• Continuity in auction design
• Correlated Information and Mecanism Design
• Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions
• Implementation in differential information economies
• Informational Size and Incentive Compatibility
• Mechanism design with multidimensional, continuous types and interdependent valuations
• On the Generic (Im)Possibility of Full Surplus Extraction in Mechanism Design
• Private information in large economies
• Surplus extraction and competition
• The relevance of private information in mechanism design

Cited in

(3)

• Mechanism design with ambiguous transfers: an analysis in finite dimensional naive type spaces
• Beliefs, payoffs, information: on the robustness of the BDP property in models with endogenous beliefs
• Private information in large economies

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