Cost of efficiency in trading perfect complements

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2023.111236MaRDI QIDQ6093777zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Rakesh Chaturvedi

Publication date 12 September 2023

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2023.111236

zbMATH Keywords

holdout problemmechanism designtrading complements

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Mechanism design theory (91B03) Trade models (91B60)

Recommendations

• On the Trade off Between Deficit and Inefficiency and the Double Auction with a Fixed Transaction Fee
• Ex ante efficient, ex post individually rational trade
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Cites work

• A characterization of efficient, Bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms
• Asymmetric Information Bargaining Problems with Many Agents
• Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
• Incentives in Teams
• Mechanism design for land acquisition

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