Evidence games: lying aversion and commitment

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2025.09.009MaRDI QIDQ6911050zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Elif B. Osun, Erkut Y. Ozbay

Publication date 27 October 2025

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/J.GEB.2025.09.009

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Experimental studies (91A90)

Cites work

• A score based approach to wild bootstrap inference
• An experimental study of truth-telling in a sender-receiver game
• Commitment and observability in games
• Communication with evidence in the lab
• Communication with partially verifiable information: an experiment
• Credulity, lies, and costly talk
• Disclosure of information under competition: an experimental study
• Enjoy the silence: An experiment on truth-telling
• Games with imperfectly observable commitment
• Golden Eggs and Hyperbolic Discounting
• Hard evidence and mechanism design
• Hiding an inconvenient truth: lies and vagueness
• Mechanism design with partial state verifiability
• On Optimal Rules of Persuasion
• Overcommunication in strategic information transmission games
• Partially Verifiable Information and Mechanism Design
• Perfect versus imperfect observability -- an experimental test of Bagwell's result
• Preferences for Truth‐Telling
• Promises and Partnership
• Rules and commitment in communication: an experimental analysis
• Strategic Information Transmission
• Strategic communication with lying costs
• Strategic reasoning in persuasion games: an experiment
• The role of verifiability and privacy in the strategic provision of performance feedback: theory and experimental evidence
• Unforeseen Contingencies and Incomplete Contracts

This page was built for publication: Evidence games: lying aversion and commitment

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q6911050)