scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4145617
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zbMATH Open0698.90009MaRDI QIDQ3476541FDOQ3476541
Authors: Rafael Repullo 
Publication date: 1989
Title of this publication is not available (Why is that?)
Recommendations
incomplete informationsocial choicecomplete informationNash strategiesdirect mechanismBayesian strategiessubdirect mechanismtrue implementation
Cited In (20)
- Imperfect commitment and the revelation principle: The multi-agent case
- A revelation principle for obviously strategy-proof implementation
- Implementation via Augmented Revelation Mechanisms
- Deterministic mechanisms and the revelation principle
- Deterministic mechanisms, the revelation principle, and ex-post constraints
- The revelation principle in multistage games
- Stopping agents from ``cheating
- Dominant strategy implementation in economic environments
- Implementation with Incomplete Information in Exchange Economies
- Dominant strategy implementation of Bayesian incentive compatible allocation rules
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Partially Verifiable Information and Mechanism Design
- A revelation principle for competing mechanisms
- Indifference, neutrality and informativeness: Generalizing the three prisoners paradox
- A unified framework for implementation and the revelation principle
- Implementation in Dominant Strategies under Complete and Incomplete Information
- On the difficulty of eliciting summary information
- Information disclosure in the framework of Kolmogorov complexity
- Virtual implementation in incomplete information environments with infinite alternatives and types
- Implementation by self-relevant mechanisms
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