Experimental design to persuade
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Publication:2343397
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2015.02.006zbMath1318.91037OpenAlexW3124085812MaRDI QIDQ2343397
Publication date: 5 May 2015
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://research.economics.unsw.edu.au/RePEc/papers/2013-17.pdf
Applications of game theory (91A80) Economics of information (91B44) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)
Related Items
Bayesian persuasion with heterogeneous priors, On the benefits of being constrained when receiving signals, Informationally robust trade and limits to contagion, Censorship as optimal persuasion, Persuasion with unknown beliefs, Persuasion, binary choice, and the costs of dishonesty, Bayesian persuasion by a privately informed sender, Test design under voluntary participation, Limiting sender's information in Bayesian persuasion, Can a better informed listener be easier to persuade?, Resisting persuasion, Algorithmic Bayesian Persuasion, Regret-minimizing Bayesian persuasion, Algorithms for Persuasion with Limited Communication
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