Experimental design to persuade
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Publication:2343397
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2015.02.006zbMath1318.91037OpenAlexW3124085812MaRDI QIDQ2343397
Publication date: 5 May 2015
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://research.economics.unsw.edu.au/RePEc/papers/2013-17.pdf
Applications of game theory (91A80) Economics of information (91B44) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)
Related Items (14)
Bayesian persuasion with heterogeneous priors ⋮ On the benefits of being constrained when receiving signals ⋮ Informationally robust trade and limits to contagion ⋮ Censorship as optimal persuasion ⋮ Persuasion with unknown beliefs ⋮ Persuasion, binary choice, and the costs of dishonesty ⋮ Bayesian persuasion by a privately informed sender ⋮ Test design under voluntary participation ⋮ Limiting sender's information in Bayesian persuasion ⋮ Can a better informed listener be easier to persuade? ⋮ Resisting persuasion ⋮ Algorithmic Bayesian Persuasion ⋮ Regret-minimizing Bayesian persuasion ⋮ Algorithms for Persuasion with Limited Communication
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