Experimental design to persuade

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2015.02.006MaRDI QIDQ2343397zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Anton Kolotilin

Publication date 5 May 2015

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://research.economics.unsw.edu.au/RePEc/papers/2013-17.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

information disclosurepersuasionstochastic orders

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Applications of game theory (91A80) Economics of information (91B44)

Recommendations

• Persuasion of a privately informed receiver
• BAYESIAN PERSUASION WITH PRIVATE EXPERIMENTATION
• On the value of persuasion by experts
• Persuasion with costly precision
• Competition in persuasion: an experiment

Cites work

• A two-person game of information transmission
• Apparent overconfidence
• Bayes correlated equilibrium and the comparison of information structures in games
• Bayesian persuasion with multiple senders and rich signal spaces
• Certifiable pre-play communication: full disclosure
• Comparing location experiments
• Comparison of information structures
• Comparison of information structures in zero-sum games
• Equivalent Comparisons of Experiments
• Five legitimate definitions of correlated equilibrium in games with incomplete information
• Garbling of signals and outcome equivalence
• Hard evidence and mechanism design
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4014390 (Why is no real title available?)
• Implementation with evidence
• Information structures in optimal auctions
• Informational control and organizational design
• Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal
• Mechanism design with partial state verifiability
• On Optimal Rules of Persuasion
• Partially Verifiable Information and Mechanism Design
• Sequential decisions with tests
• Signaling and mediation in games with common interests
• Stochastic orders
• Strategic Information Revelation
• Strategic Information Transmission
• Strategic Information Transmission with Verifiable Messages
• Sufficiency and Approximate Sufficiency
• The optimal choice of pre-launch reviewer
• The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal, II: Common Values
• The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal: The Case of Private Values
• Value of public information in sender-receiver games

Cited in

(21)

• Test design under voluntary participation
• Can a better informed listener be easier to persuade?
• Resisting persuasion
• Regret-minimizing Bayesian persuasion
• On the benefits of being constrained when receiving signals
• Limiting sender's information in Bayesian persuasion
• Bayesian persuasion with heterogeneous priors
• Informationally robust trade and limits to contagion
• Persuasion of a privately informed receiver
• Persuasion, binary choice, and the costs of dishonesty
• The face value of arguments with and without manipulation
• Bayesian persuasion by a privately informed sender
• Algorithms for persuasion with limited communication
• Setting an exam as an information design problem
• Censorship as optimal persuasion
• Persuasion with unknown beliefs
• Experiments versus distributions of posteriors
• Speak or wait: strategic delay and the value of public information
• Persuasion with verifiable information
• Lying in persuasion
• Persuasion meets delegation

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