Can a better informed listener be easier to persuade?

DOI10.1007/S00199-020-01321-WMaRDI QIDQ2074038zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Jacopo Bizzotto, Adrien Vigier

Publication date 4 February 2022

Published in Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-020-01321-w

zbMATH Keywords

Bayesian persuasiondynamic gamesinformation provision

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Dynamic games (91A25) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Recommendations

• Persuasion and receiver's news
• Bayesian persuasion with heterogeneous priors
• Noisy persuasion
• Bayesian persuasion with costly information acquisition
• Limiting sender's information in Bayesian persuasion

Cites work

• Competition in persuasion
• Competitive information disclosure by multiple senders
• Dynamic persuasion
• Equivalent Comparisons of Experiments
• Experimental design to persuade
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3045589 (Why is no real title available?)
• Repeated games with incomplete information. With the collaboration of Richard E. Stearns
• When to drop a bombshell

Cited in

(6)

• Bayesian persuasion and information design: perspectives and open issues. Introduction to the special issue on communication and persuasion
• Resisting persuasion
• Bayesian persuasion in sequential trials
• Noisy persuasion
• On the equivalence of information design by uninformed and informed principals
• Continuous-time persuasion by filtering

This page was built for publication: Can a better informed listener be easier to persuade?

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2074038)