When to drop a bombshell

DOI10.1093/RESTUD/RDX070MaRDI QIDQ4610465zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Gabriele Gratton, Richard T. Holden, Anton Kolotilin

Publication date 23 January 2019

Published in Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdx070

zbMATH Keywords

Bayesian learningcredibility versus scrutinyinformation disclosurestrategic timing

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Voting theory (91B12)

Recommendations

• Information acquisition and the value of bad news
• False modesty: when disclosing good news looks bad
• The battle of opinion: dynamic information revelation by ideological senders
• Optimal timing of policy announcements in dynamic election campaigns
• De-biasing strategic communication

Cited in

(8)

• Can a better informed listener be easier to persuade?
• Persuasion with costly precision
• Public information: relevance or salience?
• Editorial. Introduction to the special issue political games: strategy, persuasion, and learning
• Electoral competition with strategic disclosure
• When to ask for an update: timing in strategic communication
• Make it 'til you fake it
• Truth-telling in dynamic reputational cheap talk

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