On the benefits of being constrained when receiving signals
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2152112
DOI10.1007/978-3-030-94676-0_10OpenAlexW4226006458MaRDI QIDQ2152112
Vijay G. Subramanian, Shih-Tang Su, David Kempe
Publication date: 6 July 2022
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2110.10909
Applications of game theory (91A80) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Internet topics (68M11)
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