On the long run implications of repeated moral hazard

DOI10.1006/JETH.1997.2389MaRDI QIDQ1270057zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Christopher Phelan

Publication date 5 May 1999

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://semanticscholar.org/paper/ee75c2141a4b7d2307e7a641df26a674c113f26e, http://www.dklevine.com/archive/refs42006.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

long-run consumptionmoral hazard

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economic growth models (91B62)

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Cites work

• Dynamic Insurance with Private Information and Balanced Budgets
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4060392 (Why is no real title available?)
• Incentives and Aggregate Shocks
• Income fluctuation and asymmetric information: An example of a repeated principal-agent problem
• On Efficient Distribution with Private Information
• Repeated Moral Hazard
• Repeated moral hazard and one-sided commitment
• The law of large numbers with a continuum of i.i.d. random variables

Cited in

(13)

• Repeated insurance contracts and moral hazard
• Markov-perfect risk sharing, moral hazard and limited commitment
• On Ramsey's conjecture: efficient allocations in the neoclassical growth model with private information
• Repeated moral hazard and one-sided commitment
• Risk sharing contracts with private information and one-sided commitment
• From equals to despots: the dynamics of repeated decision making in partnerships with private information
• Dynamic risk-sharing with two-sided moral hazard
• EFFICIENCY–EQUALITY TRADE-OFF OF SOCIAL INSURANCE
• Optimal contracting with dynastic altruism: family size and per capita consumption
• A theory of political and economic cycles
• Repeated moral hazard with effort persistence
• Insurance and inequality with persistent private information
• Endogenous groups and dynamic selection in mechanism design

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